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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v,
Case No. 900266-CA
Priority No. 2

ROBERT WILLIAM SMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend. IV;
Utah Const, art. I, § 14;
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-50 (1986);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (1982);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1982);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4 (1982).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the officers possess probable cause to believe that

Appellant was involved in a burglary?
2.

Did the officers violate Appellant's constitutional

rights when they entered his apartment?
A.

Did the State prove that the officers received

Appellant's consent to enter his apartment?
B.

Did Appellant give valid consent?

C.

If Appellant consented, did the officers exceed

the scope of consent?
3.

Were the officers justified in searching Appellant's

4.

Did the State prove that Appellant's wife voluntarily

wife?

consented to the search of the apartment?
5.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant

Appellant's motion to suppress?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The standard of review for a trial court's finding of fact
is that a finding shall not be set aside unless it is clearly
erroneous.

A finding not supported by substantial, competent

evidence must be rejected."

State v. Arroyo. 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13,

14 (Utah 1990).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On November 1, 1989, the State and Defendant/Appellant
Robert W. Smith appeared before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno during
a motion to suppress proceeding.

Record at 97; Transcript of Motion

to Suppress Proceedings, dated November 1, 1989 [hereinafter
referred to as "MS"] at 1-45.
Appellant's motion.

(R 63).

Thereafter, the court denied
Appellant Smith then entered a guilty

plea conditioned upon his right to withdraw the plea if, following
his appeal, this Court held that the trial court erred in denying
the motion to suppress.

(R 64-70).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 18, 1989, Officer Michael Ted Jensen responded
to a dispatch report of a burglary at "Broadway Pharmacy" on
242 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah.

(MS 2, 3, 12). Officer

Jensen contacted the owner of the pharmacy and discovered that
"large amounts" of pharmaceutical drugs were missing.
(MS 3, 12, 13). A "bunch of quarters" were also missing.
(MS 4, 13). Approximately forty-five minutes after Officer Jensen
arrived at the scene, he was approached by an individual, Mr. Cook,
who "stated that he had found a partially full container of Demerol
in the apartment complex where he lived."

(MS 4, 12).

Cook directed Officer Jensen and an accompanying officer,
Officer Linton, to the the apartment complex.

(MS 4, 12). Once

inside the complex, Cook indicated that he had found the container
in the hallway of the "second floor."

- 3

(MS 5, 14). After inspecting

the spot where Cook had found the container, the officers looked "up
and down the hallway to see if [they] could find any more items that
may have [been] related to the burglary."

(MS 5, 14).

Approximately fifteen minutes later, the officers found
"two quarters" on the third floor of the apartment.

(MS

6, 14).

One quarter was "directly next to the door [of Robert Smith's]
apartment [number 13]."

(MS 6, 14). Without taking any action,1

the officers returned to their police car and radioed Sergeant
Jackson for assistance.

(MS 27). When Jackson arrived, Officers

Jensen and Linton were waiting for him outside the apartment.
(MS 27). After Jensen and Linton told Jackson about the "evidence"
that they had found, the officers returned to apartment number 13.
(MS 28).
Standing outside the door, the officers heard the Smith's
arguing about their child.

"Apparently, she had a child that had

been taken by the police and put into protective custody."
(MS 24). She was upset with her husband, telling him, "you
shouldn't have walked away from the kid. . . She kept talking about
drugs and, you know, you need to get help, and just things like
that."

(MS 24). The officers listened to the argument for five to

ten minutes before deciding to act.

(MS 15, 24).

1

Officer Jensen's testimony indicates that after he and
Officer Jensen found the quarters by the Smith apartment, they
listened to the arguing and then knocked on the door. (MS 7 ) .
Jensen also indicated that Sergeant Jackson had joined them and
listened to the argument, too. (MS 15). Howcrver, Sergeant
Jackson's testimony reveals that the investigating officers must
have first returned to their police car and awaited Jackson's
arrival before they knocked on the door. (MS 27).
- 4
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According to the Smiths, in the midst of their argument,
"The door flew open and the police officers [were] in our home
[apartment thirteen]."
and the door frame.

(MS 33, 38). They damaged the door handle

(MS 36). The door would no longer lock from

the inside or the outside.

(MS 40). The officers walked into the

apartment and claimed that they had a search warrant.

(MS 33).

They searched the apartment and arrested the Smiths without any sort
of explanation.

(MS 35). Robert Smith and his wife were handcuffed

on a love seat and a couch in the living room.

(MS 35, 41). The

officers did not knock on the door before entering the apartment,
nor did they receive permission to enter or search the apartment.
(MS 33, 34). They seized some Demerol, a syringe, and approximately
$4.00 worth of quarters from Robert Smith's pockets.
No other kinds of drugs were found.

(MS 10, 11).

(MS 20).

The story told by the police differed greatly from the
testimony of the Smiths. According to the police, after they
reached the Smith's apartment they listened to the Smiths "yelling"
for five to ten minutes before knocking on their door.

(MS 7).

The

officers sought "to find out what the disturbance was about and see
if we could get them quieted down.
about the burglary."

(MS 8).

And the other reason was to ask

Yet, when Robert Smith answered the

door, Jensen asked only, "what the noise was about [and] informed
him they were creating a disturbance."

(MS 8).

Jensen did not

express his desire to discuss the burglary of the Broadway
Pharmacy.

(MS 28). According to the police, Robert Smith agreed to

let the officers in to talk about the argument.
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(MS 16).

Officer Jensen noticed two more quarters on the floor in
the front room.

(MS 17). Jensen approached Robert Smith while

Sergeant Jackson confronted Linda Smith "just inside the doorway to
the kitchen, probably ten feet away" from her husband.

(MS 9, 24).

Jackson observed Linda Smith "holding a box in one hand and
walking towards the garbage can with it. . . ." (MS 25). She had
her other "hand clenched."

Jackson saw her put the box in the

garbage and noticed that her other hand was still closed.
asked her, 'What do you have in there?

"So [he]

What's in there?' And she

reached over and put her hand over on the counter.

So [he] just

grabbed her [by the wrist] and she opened [her hand] up and there
were two glass ampules in her hand."

(MS 25). Jackson looked at

the box in the garbage which had the word, Demerol, written on it.
(MS 25).
He asked her, "Do you mind if we look through your
apartment and search?" According to Jackson, she said, "Okay."
(MS 26). Jackson told the other officers that she had consented to
the search.

(MS 31). At this point, the officers handcuffed

Mr. Smith and placed him under arrest.
also handcuffed.

(MS 11). Mrs. Smith was

(MS 18). The officers arrested only Mr. Smith,

because "witnesses had described a white male adult fleeing the
scene of the burglary and only a white male adult."

(MS 11). The

officers "called another officer to stand by M!r. Smith, just to
watch him."

(MS 31). Jackson then supervised Officers Linton and

Jensen in the search of the apartment but Jackson did not actually
participate in the search.

(MS 26, 31). The officers took
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photographs of the apartment, the door, and the hallway before
completing their investigation.

(MS 44).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The police officers' conduct in entering Appellant's
apartment, without a warrant, was unlawful.

No exigent

circumstances existed, nor were they in "hot pursuit" of a suspect.
The respective parties disagree on whether Appellant consented to
the officers' entry into the apartment and whether Appellant's wife
consented to the search of the apartment.

The State did not meet

its burden of proof on either type of consent.
If the officers forced their way into Appellant's
apartment, as alluded to by the facts, the officers' conduct cannot
be justified under any circumstance.

A warrantless, nonconsensual

entry into an individual's home is unconstitutional.
If the officers received Appellant's consent, it was
obtained involuntarily in response to a pretextual excuse used by
the police and pursuant to their "color of authority."

The officers

exceeded the scope of consent when they conducted a search of
Appellant's wife for reasons unconnected to the purpose given for
their entry into the apartment.

The search of her "person" could

not be justified since there were no facts supportive of probable
cause nor was there a fear that Appellant's wife could be armed or
dangerous.
In addition to the prior police illegalities, all of which
invalidated the officers' subsequent conduct, the consent given by

- 7
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Appellant's wife could not be considered to have been given freely
and intelligently.

She consented to the search only after an

officer grabbed her.

The evidence obtained should have been

suppressed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
POLICE WERE PROHIBITED FROM MAKING A WARRANTLESS AND
NONCONSENSUAL ENTRY INTO APPELLANTS HOME.
"It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law7 that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable."
(1980).

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586

The Fourth Amendment states in relevant part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .

U.S. Const, amend IV; accord Utah Const, art. I, § 14. As explained
below, the police officer's warrantless and nonconsensual entry
inside the Smiths' apartment violated Robert and Linda Smith's
constitutional rights.
to suppress.
A.

The trial court erred in denying the motion

(R 63).
PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT EXIST FOR THE OFFICERS'
ENTRY INTO THE APARTMENT.

"A peace officer may . . . without [a] warrant, arrest a
person . . . when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has
been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person
arrested has committed it. . . ." U.C.A. §77-7-2 (1982).
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"'[P]robable cause to justify an arrest means facts and
circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to
warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing
under the circumstances shown that the suspect has committed, or is
committing, or is about to commit an offense."

Michigan v.

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); cf. State v. Avala, 762 P.2d
1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988) ("The standard for evaluating an arrest
for an offense not committed in the officer's presence is an
objective one:

'[W]hether from the facts known to the officer, and

the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable
arid prudent person in his position would be justified in believing
that the suspect had committed the offense'").
Following the burglary of "Broadway Pharmacy," the facts
available to the investigating officers were very general and of
little assistance.

A "male white adult" wearing "blue jeans" was

seen "fleeing the scene" of the crime.

(MS 19). Such a vague

description represents the vast majority of the Salt Lake City male
population.

No specific characteristics were reported, including

such general features as height, weight, or hair color.

The

physical description of the suspect could not have provided any
basis for probable cause.

Cf. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 331 A.2d 189

(Penn. 1975) (probable cause did not exist for the arrest of
suspects matching a general description, broadcasted over the police
radio, of "two Negro males in dark clothing, 5'6" to 5'8" in height,
with medium builds, medium to dark complexions and semi-bush
haircuts").
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According to the owner of the pharmacy, the suspect took "a
large amount of narcotics" and "a bunch of quarters" from the
store.

(MS 3, 4, 13). The owner would not be sure of how much of

each type of narcotic was missing "until he did a complete
inventory."

(MS 13). However, Officer Jensen apparently assumed

that Demerol had been taken2 from the burglary when a "Mr. Cook"
told him "that he [Cook] had found a partially full container of
Demerol in the apartment complex where he lived."

(MS 4, 12).

Officer Jensen's testimony did not establish, nor did the State in
any other manner prove, that the pill container was in fact a
"fruit" of the pharmacy burglary.

Officer Jensen did not ask the

owner of the pharmacy if the pill container may have been stolen
from his store.

(MS 4-5, 12-13).

Instead, Jensen and an

accompanying officer, Officer Linton, having already been at the
scene of the burglary for approximately forty-five minutes without
any apparent "leads," assumed that Mr. Cook's "discovery" was
related to the burglary.3

2

The owner did not state that "Demerol" was missing at
the time he first spoke to Officer Jensen. Rather, the owner told
Officer Jensen that he would not be sure of how much of each type of
narcotic was missing "until he did a complete inventory." (MS 13).
Thereafter, upon completing their "investigation" of the Smiths'
apartment, the officers did determine that Demerol had been taken.
The owner "did do a partial inventory" of his pharmacy by the time
Robert Smith had been arrested. (MS 21).
3

The record does not reveal the circumstances surrounding
Mr. Cook's finding of the pill container. The officers indicate
only that Cook directed them to the place where he found the pill
container—on the "[s]econd floor in the hallway next to the
stairs." (MS 5). The officers did not state, nor does it appear
(continued)
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Mr. Cook showed the officers where he had found the
container in the hallway of the "second floor" of the apartment
complex.

(MS 5, 14). Officers Jensen and Linton then "looked

around the apartment building, up and down the hallway to see if
[they] could find any more items that may have [been] related to the
burglary."

(MS 5, 14). Approximately fifteen minutes later, the

officers found "two quarters" on the third floor of the complex.
(MS 6, 14). One quarter was "directly next to the door" of
apartment number 13.

(MS 6, 14). Finding two quarters on the third

floor of an apartment complex does not support a finding of probable
cause.

The coins were found on a level entirely different from the

level on which the pill container was found.

The coins were not

unique or identifiable, nor was the amount of "change" significant,
especially in an apartment complex where laundry facilities would be
available.
Upon seeing the quarters, one of two things occurred.
Officers Jensen and Linton either returned immediately to their
police car to radio Sergeant Jackson,4 or they first listened to the

(footnote 3 continued)
that they knew, whether Mr. Cook was returning to, or coming from,
the apartment complex when he "found" the container; if Cook was
returning to the apartment, how long had he been away from the
apartment?; if he was leaving his apartment, how long had he been in
his room?; how often did he "[pass] by" the place where the pills
were found?; in which apartment did he live?; on which floor did he
live?; how large was the apartment complex?; and how long was the
pill container there before it was found?
4

See supra note 1. In addition, when the officers
radioed Sergeant Jackson for assistance, they did not discuss a
"disturbing the peace situation." (MS 27).
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Smiths "yelling" and "creating a disturbance" before calling for
assistance,

(MS 27) . Under either scenario, the two officers took

no action until Sergeant Jackson arrived.

(MS 27) .

When Jackson arrived, Officers Jensen and Linton told him
about the "property" that they had found.

(MS 27). The three

officers returned to apartment number 13.

(MS 28). They stood

outside the apartment door, listening to the Smiths arguing about
their child.

"Apparently, she had a child that had been taken by

the police and put into protective custody."

(MS 24). Sh€> was

upset with her husband, telling him, "you shouldn't have walked away
from the kid. . . She kept talking about drugs and, you know, you
need to get help, and just things like that."

(MS 24). The subject

matter of the argument did not provide the officers with further
clues for their burglary investigation.
The "kid" was apparently taken away from the parents.
(MS 7).

Understandably upset, the mother yelled at her husband for

his role in the situation.

While the father may have needed "to get

help," his problem with drugs was fully consistent with the severity
of the situation.

Moreover, there was no indication whether the

husband's problem with "drugs or narcotics" involved either illegal
"street" drugs or prescription drugs.

(MS 7, 15, 24). Nothing the

Smiths said pertained to prescription drugs.
Nevertheless, the officers simply concluded that the "drug"
discussion was in some way related to the burglary.

Such a

conclusion was not supported by the content of the discussion.
Smiths were not discussing details of a burglary.

- 12 -

The

They were not

discussing how "great" drugs were or the amount of drugs that were
stolen.

In short, they were not discussing anything related to the

pharmacy burglary.

Rather, the Smiths were attempting to resolve a

serious family crisis.

Their family crisis, like many other neglect

cases, involved a problem with drugs.

Cf. Annotation, Physical

Abuse of Child by Parent as Ground for Termination of Parental Right
to Child, 53 A.L.R.3d 605 §4(a) (mistreatment due to alcoholism).
In addition, the officers could not have truly believed
that the argument required prompt intervention.

They would not have

patiently stood outside the apartment door, listening to prolonged
bouts of yelling which they could hear "down the hall" if the noise
level had in fact constituted a "disturbance."

(MS 15, 24).

Officer Jensen admitted that they listened to the arguing for
approximately ten minutes.

(MS 15). Sergeant Jackson stated that

they "probably listened a good five minutes, anyway" before they
acted.

(MS 24). None of the officers felt the immediate need to

quell the argument prior to entering the apartment.

Indeed, Officer

Jensen conceded that the officers wanted to hear what the Smiths
were arguing about, probably because they were in search of further
clues:

"We [the officers] listened outside the door.

lot of yelling, a lot of disturbance.
(MS 6).

There was a

We were curious as to why."

The officers uncovered no further clues.
After determining that the Smiths were upset about their

child, the officers forced their way into the apartment.

The police

did not knock on the door, nor did they ask for permission to
enter.

(MS 33, 34, 38). The door "flew open" and the police
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officers entered the apartment.
that he had a search warrant.

(MS 33, 38). One officer claimed
(MS 33, 35, 39). The officers

handcuffed Robert and Linda Smith on a love seat and a couch in the
living room while they searched the home.

(MS 35, 41). There was

no justification for the arrest or the search.

U.S. Const,

amend IV; Utah Const, art. I, § 14; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980); Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968) (when
an individual consents to a search only after the police have
asserted that they have a search warrant, the consent cannot be
considered to have been "freely given").
Prudent officers would not have had probable cause to
believe that a man, heard arguing in his third floor apartment with
his wife over their child and "drugs," was a suspect of a burglary
when the only other facts known to the officers was that a
"partially full container of Demerol," which may or may not have
been stolen from the pharmacy, was found on the* second floor of the
complex where the "suspect" and many other tenants lived, and that
two quarters were found beside an apartment door.
§ 77-7-2 (1982).
suppressed.

Cf. U.CA.

Accordingly, the evidence should have been

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) ("if

evidence used against the defendant had been found to have been
acquired in violation of constitutional guarantees, its exclusion
would be inevitably required").
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B.

IF PROBABLE CAUSE DID EXIST, THE POLICE
OFFICERS STILL PERFORMED AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE.

Assuming, arguendo, that the information known to the
officers did support a finding of probable cause, they still were
not justified in entering the apartment or in arresting the Smiths.
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy
in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's
home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and
specific constitutional terms: "The right of the
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall
not be violated." That language unequivocally
establishes the proposition that "[a]t the very core
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion. In terms that
apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures
of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line
at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (citations omitted);
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person within,
the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unannounced police intrusion
into a private home, with or without an arrest warrant, except
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers7 authority
and purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief
that persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or
(3) where those within, made aware of the presence of someone
outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door),
are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the
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belief that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being
attempted).
The officers in the case at bar admitted that they neither
possessed nor claimed to have a search warrant when they entered the
Smiths' apartment.

(MS 44). No exigent circumstances existed.

The

officers listened to the Smiths argue for five to ten minutes before
deciding to act.5

(MS 15, 24). The Smiths were not aware of the

officers7 presence outside the door.

(MS 30-31).

As explained by

Judge Leventhal in an opinion given much consideration by the Pavton
Court, "absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search
for . . . contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been
committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating
evidence will be found within."

Payton, 445 U.S at 587-88

(construing Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(en banc) (Leventhal, J.); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.

, 109

L.Ed.2d 85, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990) ("a suspect should not be arrested
in his house without an arrest warrant, even though there is
probable cause to arrest him").

Thus, even if probable cause did in

5

If the Smiths were arguing when Officers Jensen and
Linton first discovered the two quarters, the officers had ample
time to make a request for a warrant while they awaited the arrival
of Sergeant Jackson. See U.C.A. § 77-23-4(2) (1982) (telephone
authorization for a warrant); see supra note 1. If the Smiths began
arguing just before the arrival of the three officers, nothing
overheard in the conversation would have required immediate action
by the police. Cf. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (absent a
demonstrable threat of imminent destruction of evidence, the
authorities may not enter a residence in order to preserve that
evidence without a warrant).
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fact exist, the officers' warrantless and nonconsensual entry
rendered the evidence inadmissible.
POINT II
EVEN THOUGH A WARRANT MAY NOT BE REQUIRED TO ENTER A
HOUSE WHEN CONSENT HAS IN FACT BEEN PROPERLY GIVEN,
THE OFFICERS DID NOT RECEIVE APPELLANT'S CONSENT TO
ENTER THE HOUSE.
In order to avoid the "reach" of Payton, the State must
prove that the officers, acting without a warrant, received Robert
Smith's consent to enter the apartment and also obtained Linda
Smith's consent to search the premises.

The State must then prove

that the officers did not exceed the scope of consent, if any, given
to them by the Smiths.

See State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13,

15 (Utah 1990).
A.

THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THAT THE SMITHS
CONSENTED TO THE POLICE OFFICERS' ENTRY INTO
THE APARTMENT.

"The burden of establishing the existence of one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement is on the prosecution.

To

establish the consent exception, the state must demonstrate that the
consent was voluntary."

Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15; see also

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) ("The exceptions are
'jealously and carefully drawn,7 and there must be a Showing by
those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation
made [the search] imperative.7").
The State did not meet its burden.

Robert and Linda Smith

both testified that in the midst of their argument, the door "flew
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open."

(MS 33, 38). The officers did not knock on the door, nor

did they receive permission to enter the apartment.

(MS 34, 38).

Rather, "they kicked the door in," causing damage to the door
handle, the "upper left-hand side of the door," and the door frame.
(MS 36). After the entry by the officers, the door would no longer
lock from the inside or the outside.

(MS 40).

Though the police stated that they received permission to
enter the apartment, (MS 44), they failed to produce corroborating
evidence which would have unquestionably refuted the Smiths'
testimony.

"A finding [of fact, consent,] not supported by

substantial, competent evidence must be rejected."
Adv. Rep. at 14 (citation omitted).

Arroyo, 137 Utah

Officer Jackson believed that

they had taken photographs of the apartment, "the door or the area
around the door," and the "hallway where the quarters were found."
(MS 44). Curiously, the photographs were never presented to the
court.

Having missed its opportunity to "tip the scales" in its

favor, the State did not carry its burden of proof.

Moreover, as

explained below, other circumstances existed which also evidenced a
lack of voluntary consent.
B.

EVEN IF CONSENT WAS GIVEN FOR ENTRY INTO THE
APARTMENT, IT WAS NOT GIVEN VOLUNTARILY.

"The case law holds that a consent which is not voluntarily
given is invalid."
1990).

State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15 (Utah

"Generally, whether the requisite voluntariness exists

depends on 'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both
the characteristics of the accused and the details o f police
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conduct."

Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. The totality of the

surrounding circumstances include the pretextual approach used by
the officers to gain entry into the apartment and the lack of
specific consent given freely and intelligently by Robert Smith.
1.

The pretextual approach used by the police
invalidated the consent given to enter the
apartment.

lf

[I]t is impermissible for law enforcement officers to use

a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to search for evidence of a more
serious crime."

State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App.

1988) . As noted by the Sierra Court:
The violation of a constitutional right by a
subterfuge cannot be justified. . . Were the use of
misdemeanor arrest warrants as a pretext for searching
people suspected of felonies to be permitted, a
mockery could be made of the Fourth Amendment and its
guarantees. The courts must be vigilant to detect and
prevent such a misuse of legal processes.
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977 (citing Taalavore v. United States. 291 F.2d
262, 266 (9th Cir. 1961); Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740 (1984);
cf. State v. Lorenzo. 743 S.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Mo. App. 1987)
("Consent to search cannot be considered freely and intelligently
given when a police officer misleads the person from whom consent is
sought as to his intentions").
When Officers Jensen and Linton summoned Sergeant Jackson
to the apartment complex, Jackson was not informed about the
"disturbance," a possible misdemeanor offense.

(MS 27); U.C.A.

§ 76-9-102 (1982) . Instead, the officers first became aware of the
"disturbance" after looking "up and down the hallway [for
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approximately fifteen minutes] to see if [they] could find any more
items that may have [been] related to the burglary."

(MS 5, 14).

The officers did not receive a complaint about the "yelling" from
the neighbors above, below, or beside the Smiths.

Indeed, if the

noise had been as loud as the officers contended, a reasonable
officer would have acted immediately.

Cf. U.C.A.

§ 76-9-102(1) (b) (iii) (1982) (a person is guilty of "'Disorderly
Conduct" if he makes unreasonable noises in a p>rivate place which
can be heard in a public place); see also U.C.A. § 10-8-50 (1986)
("Disturbing the peace").
Even assuming, arguendo, that the noise did rise to the
level of "disorderly conduct," the officers only used the argument
as a pretext to search for evidence of the burglary.
did not mention the burglary.

Officer Jensen

Rather, he asked Robert Smith only,

"what the noise was about [and] informed him they were creating a
disturbance."

(MS 8).

However, the officers had already discovered

"what the noise was about," having just overheard the argument.
(MS 7, 15, 24) .
The officers had similarly accomplished another purposes
to eliminate the disturbance.

The Smiths stopped arguing after the

officers knocked on the door.

The officers should have warned the

Smiths about the noise and departed immediately or, at most, issued
a citation for disorderly conduct.

See U.C.A. § 76-9-102 (1982)

(Disorderly conduct "is a class C misdemeanor if the offense
continues after a request by a person to desist.
an infraction").

Otherwise, it is

The officers did not have to enter the apartment.
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No exigencies or signs of domestic violence existed.

If "it is

impermissible for . . . officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a
pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime," Sierra,
754 P.2d at 977, it should be even more egregious for officers to
use a misdemeanor inquiry as a pretext to search for evidence of a
more serious crime.
Because the true purpose of the officers7 questioning was
based on a hunch, they chose not to inform Robert Smith about their
desire to discuss the burglary.

If the officers had been more

forthright, Robert Smith may not have been so accommodating, as
alleged by the State, to allow the police into his home.
Consequently, Robert Smith did not "freely and intelligently" give
his consent to the officers.

As alluded to previously:

(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that
the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely
and intelligently given"; (2) the government must
prove consent was given without duress or coercion,
express or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be
convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
United States v. Abbott. 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977)

reprinted in State v. Marshall. 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 49 (Utah App.
1990).
Even according to the officers' own testimony, Robert Smith
was never told that they wanted to talk about the burglary (MS 16,
28).

Smith could thus not have specifically consented to the

officers' entry for anything other than the "disturbance."

While

the officers may have subjectively intended to discuss the burglary,
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(MS 8), they did not convey their intentions to the Smiths.

Consent

was not "freely and intelligently given."
2.

Appellant involuntarily responded to the
officers' command.

An individual's acquiescence to the "color" of police
authority cannot be considered to have been given voluntarily.

See

State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1990) ; Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).

In Johnson, officers

"experienced in narcotic work . . . recognized [the] strong odor of
burning opium" coming from a hotel room.

333 U.S. at 12. Not

knowing who occupied the room, the officers knocked on the door and
identified themselves.

After a slight delay and "some 'shuffling or

noise'" in the room, the defendant opened the door.
The officer said, "I want to talk to you a little
bit." She [the defendant] then, as he describes it,
"stepped back acquiescently and admitted us." He
said, "I want to talk to you about this opium smell
in the room here." She denied that there was such a
smell. Then he said, "I want you to consider
yourself under arrest because we are going to search
the room." The search turned up incriminating opium
and smoking apparatus, the latter being warm,
apparently from recent use. This evidence the
District Court refused to suppress before trial and
submitted over defendant's objection at the trial.
Conviction resulted and the Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added).
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
"Entry to defendant's living quarters, which was the beginning of
the search, was demanded under color of office.
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It was granted in

submission to authority rather than as an understanding and
intentional waiver of a constitutional right."

333 U.S. at 13.

Through a comparison of the two cases, Robert Smith's
"consent" was equally submissive.

The officers in Johnson smelled

opium emanating from the defendant's hotel room.

The officers here

heard an argument coming from Robert Smith's apartment.

Neither set

of officers obtained a warrant though the officers in Johnson,
unlike the officers here, at least possessed facts supportive of
probable cause.

Cf. Llaauno v. Minaey. 739 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th

Cir. 1984) ("[I]n assessing the officers criteria for probable cause
to effect a warrantless arrest, it is appropriate to consider
whether there was sufficient information to obtain an arrest
warrant"); Henry v. United States. 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (Common rumor,
suspicion, or even a "strong reason to suspect," is not adequate to
support a warrant for arrest).

Acting prematurely, the officers in

each case bypassed a judicial determination and acted on their own.
The Johnson officers knocked on the door and said, "I want
to talk to you a little bit."

333 U.S. at 12. The "Smith" officers

knocked on the door and, after using a misleading purpose to justify
their intrusion, said, "We'd like to talk to you.
in?"

Could we come

(MS 43). Defendant Johnson and Robert Smith both acquiesced.

The search of Johnson's room turned up illegal drugs and
paraphernalia.

The search of Smith's apartment uncovered "Demerol,"

a lawful prescription drug; a syringe; and some quarters.
district courts refused to suppress the evidence.
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Both

The decision of

the district court in Johnson was reversed.

The decision of the

district court, here, should similarly be reversed.
Robert Smith was not approached in the context of a
permissible casual "police/citizen encounter"; rather, Smith was
approached in his home and placed on the defensive.
greeted with cursory salutations.
identifiable6 officers.

He was not

He was confronted by three

The officers would not have permitted Smith

to say "no" to their "request" and to then close the door.

Cf.

United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 1988) (police
conducted an unjustified "search" of a hotel room when they gained
visual entry into the room through a door which was opened at their
command while they stood in the hotel corridor).
POINT III
IF PROPER CONSENT HAD BEEN GIVEN, THE OFFICERS
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT SINCE THE OFFICERS
HELD NO REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE SMITHS WERE ARMED
AND DANGEROUS.
"Even a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an
initially lawful search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment."
State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (construing

6

At the very least, Officer Jensen was identifiable as a
police officer. Mr. Cook would not have approached Jensen and told
him about the pill container if Jensen was not an officer, nor would
the owner of the pharmacy have assisted Jensen in the burglary
investigation. (MS 3, 4 ) . Officer Linton, having accompanied
Officer Jensen and Mr. Cook to the apartment, was probably Jensens
partner or an officer arriving at the scene. (MS 4,, 12). Sergeant
Jackson received Officer Jensen's call for assistance through
"dispatch," the police radio.
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Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)); State v. Arroyo, 137
Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15 (Utah 1990) (if consent was obtained through
the police exploitation of a prior illegality, the consent is not
valid).
In Schlosser, the Court considered whether a police officer
exceeded the scope of a lawful traffic stop when he opened the
vehicle's door for investigatory purposes.

Finding the officer's

actions unwarranted, the Court deemed the evidence seized in the
search to be inadmissible.

The established exceptions did not apply:

If no arrest is made, an officer may make a
warrantless search of the automobile only if there
is probable cause for the search, or if the officer
has a reasonable and "articulable suspicion that the
suspect is potentially dangerous."
Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135.
Like the officer in Schlosser who made an initial lawful
traffic stop, the officer here may have also made an initial lawful
inquiry about the "disturbance."

The subsequent actions of both

officers, however, exceeded the scope of their authority.

If an

officer makes a traffic stop, he or she may not open the passenger
door for investigatory purposes.

Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132.

Similarly, if Robert Smith permitted the officers to enter his
apartment to discuss a disturbance, the officers could not then
subject Linda Smith to an unnecessary search.

Cf. Arizona v. Hicks,

480 U.S. 321 (1987) (an officer conducted an invalid search when he
moved stereo equipment for reasons unrelated to his justified entry
into an apartment, and because he had less than probable cause to
believe the equipment was stolen).
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"Any police activity that transcends the actual scope of
the consent given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the
suspect."

State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah App. 1990)

(citation omitted).

Robert Smith authorized the officers' entry

into his apartment to talk only about the "disturbance." (MS 16).
When the officers entered, however, nothing in the record reflects
any questions by the officers which would have helped them find out
"what the noise was about . . . ."

(MS 8).

The officers, instead,

converged immediately on Robert and Linda Smith.
An officer may forego the warrant requirement for a search
if he or she "has a reasonable belief, based on 'specific and
articulable facts,' that the person may be armed and dangerous."
State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted);
State v. Schlosserf 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1988) (a search must
be justified by probable cause).

While the officers, here, may have

been concerned about their own safety, there was no indication that
the Smiths did, or could have done, anything that would have
endangered the officers.
knocked on the door.

The Smiths were arguing when the officers

The officers did not state thcit the Smiths

delayed answering the door or made suspicious noises which would
have forewarned the officers of possible danger.
Linda Smith was "just inside the doorway to the kitchen,
probably ten feet away" from her husband.

(MS 9).

When Officer

Jensen confronted Robert Smith, Sergeant Jackson confronted Linda
Smith.

(MS 9, 24). Jackson observed Linda "holding a box in one

hand and walking towards the garbage can with it. . . ."
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(MS 25).

She had her other "hand clenched."

Jackson saw her put the box in

the garbage and noticed that her other hand was still closed.
[he] asked her, 'What do you have in there?

"So

What's in there?' And

she reached over and put her hand over on the counter.

So [he] just

grabbed her [by the wrist] and she opened [her hand] up and there
were two glass ampules in her hand."

(MS 25).

Sergeant Jackson could not have reasonably believed that
Linda Smith was armed and dangerous.

Linda Smith did not reach for

a weapon nor did she appear to possess one.
closed, it was "clenched."

Not only was her hand

A gun, a knife, or a weapon could not

have been hidden in her hand.

Linda Smith communicated this fact to

Jackson when she put her hand on the counter for his viewing.
Sergeant Jackson's testimony did not reveal any fear of Mrs. Smith's
movements or of the possibility of her being armed and dangerous.
Nothing stated in the record justified the search of Linda Smith's
hand.

Cf. State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1988) (a

search must be justified by probable cause).

Like the officer in

Schlosser, Sergeant Jackson:
had no warrant, no probable cause, and no
articulable suspicion either that his safety was in
danger or that the occupants were engaged in
criminal activity. He cited no safety concerns as
the basis for his actions; he sought only to
investigate the possibility that defendants were
engaged in illegal activity . . . .
State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989).

If the Smiths

did permit the officers to enter their apartment, the officers
exceeded the consent by searching Linda Smith's hand.
her hand was unlawful.
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The search of

POINT IV
THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THAT LINDA SMITH CONSENTED
TO THE OFFICERS' SEARCH OF THEIR APARTMENT.
As explained above, consent must be "freely and
intelligently given . . . without duress or coercion,,11

State v.

Marshall. 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 49 (Utah App. 1990) (citing United
States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977).

According to

Sergeant Jackson, when he entered the apartment he did not ask Linda
Smith about the argument.

(MS 26). Rather, he wanted to see what

she was putting in the garbage.

Because Linda Smith did not

"freely" disclose what was in her hand, Jackson asked her, "What do
you have in there?"

(MS 25). Linda Smith did not respond.

(MS 29). Then Jackson "reached over and just grabbed it."
(MS 29). Only after Jackson grabbed her, did Linda Smith open up
her hand and consent to the search of the apartment.

(MS 25, 29).

Hence, Sergeant Jackson's coercive acts precipitated and nullified
Linda Smith's consent.

Her consent was not given voluntarily.

Moreover, even if Linda Smith's consent was voluntary, "the
mere fact a consent to a search or a seizure is voluntary does not
necessarily remove the taint [of a prior illegality]."

Arroyo, 137

Utah Adv. Rep. at 17 (construing State v. Gates, 202 Conn. 615, 621,
522 A.2d 788, 791 (1987)). The consent to search the apartment would
not have been "purged of the taint" of the prior consent
involuntarily given to enter the apartment.
Valid consent did not exist for either the entry into the
apartment or for the search of the apartment.

- 28 -

According to the

police, the Smiths did not physically oppose the officers or
verbally object to the 4:00 a.m. intrusion.

They acquiesced fully

and voluntarily to each and every "request" made by the officers.
Consequently, the officers should not have found it necessary to
handcuff the Smiths, (MS 18); nor should Sergeant Jackson have
"called another officer to stand by Mr. Smith, [who was already
handcuffed,] just to watch him," (MS 31), for a search that lasted
only ten minutes (MS 35), when there were already three officers on
the scene.

The actions alleged by the officers do not appear

consistent with the consent allegedly given by the Smiths.

The

officers' actions were consistent, however, with officers who had
just forced their way into an apartment and were uncertain about how
submissive and cooperative the occupants would be.

The officers did

not receive valid consent.
POINT V
THE OFFICERS' CONDUCT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED IN
HINDSIGHT.
The evidence found in the apartment, though it mysteriously
lacked other drugs which would have been present from the "large
amounts" of drugs stolen from the pharmacy, (MS 20), should not be
considered a justification for the police misconduct.

"That

reasoning, however, 'justify[ing] the arrest by the search and at
the same time . . . the search by the arrest,' just 'will not do. ,H
Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S.
(1990).

, 108 L.Ed.2d 464, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 1289

In a per curiam opinion, the Smith Court ruled that a

search is not justified when its legality is based solely upon the
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evidence seized during the search.

Id.

Police cannot maintain the

circular argument, the Court held, that the search was properly
incident to an arrest that could be justified only by the fruits of
the search.
at bar.

Id.

The Smith reasoning should also apply to the case

The evidence seized should have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM A

TEXT OF gTATUTgg fKD CONSTXTPTXPNAfr PRQVTSTOK8

Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papersf and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance
of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in thexr
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon,
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or thing to be seized.

10-8-50. Disturbing the peace — Public intoxication —
Fighting — Obscene langaage — Disorderly conduct — L e w d behavior — Interference with officers — TrespassThey may provide for the punishment of any person or persons for: (1)
disturbing the peace or good order of the city, (2) disturbing the peace of any
person or persons, (3) disturbing any lawful assembly, (4) public intoxication,
(5) challenging, encouraging or engaging in fighting, (6) using obscene or
profane language in a place or under circumstances which could cause a
breach of the peace or good order of the city, (7) engaging in indecent or
disorderly conduct, (8) engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior or conduct in
the city, and (9) interfering with any city officer in the discharge of his duty.
They may provide for the punishment of trespass and such other petty offenses as the board of commissioners or city council may deem proper.
History: R A 1898 & CA. 1907, § 206, refers to boards of commissioners and city
subd. 53; L» 1911, en. 120, § 1; 1915, ch. 100, councils of cities. See i 10-8-L
§ 1; CX. 1917, § 570x52; TLS. 1933 & C. 1943,
Cross-References, — Lewdness, § 76-915*50; L. 1973, ch. 11, § 1.
702.

76-9-102. Disorderly conduct.
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(a) He refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move
from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no legitimate puipose; or
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof:
(i) He engages infightingor in violent, tumultuous, or threatening
behavior; or
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; or
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be
heard in a public place; or
(iv) He engages in abusive or, obscene language or makes obscene
gestures in a public place; or
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to which
the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes but is
not limited to streets, highways, and the common area*; of schools, hospitals,
apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offeose continues
after a request by a person to desist Otherwise it is an infraction.

77-7-2.. By peace officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony lias been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has
committed it;
o i8)kr h 6 ^ h e hBS r ? a ! o n a b l e « " " to ^lieve the person has committed
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense: or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person*

77-23-4. Examination of complainant and witnesses —
Witness not in physical presence of magistrate —
Duplicate original warrants — Return.
(1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the issuance of a search
warrant shall be given on oath and either reduced to writing or recorded
verbatim. Transcription of the recorded testimony need not precede the issuance of the warrant. Any person having standing to contest the search may
request and shall be provided with a transcription of the recorded testimony
in support of the application for the warrant
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the absence of an
affidavit, a search warrant may be issued upon sworn oral testimony of a^
person who is not in the physical presence of the magistrate provided the
magistrate is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and transcribed
After transcription, the statement shall be certified by the magistrate and
filed with the court This statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for
purposes of this section.

